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WHAT GOES ON HERE 
An article by 
Payson S. Wild, Jr. 
Americans, like most human beings, recoil at the thought of 
war, and the idea of another war, a World War III, seems repulsive 
beyond description. However, here and there in our country, there 
are voices which are saying that we should engage in a so-called 
"preventive war" against Russia. Some of these voices are scarcely 
raised above a whisper, but the mere fact that a conflict against the 
Soviets is being urged at all is of considerable significance. Be­
cause this subject is so highly explosive, it might be argued that 
it should be kept under cover, but in a democracy such as ours, ex­
perience indicates that it is healthier to bring a discussion out into 
the open where it can be appraised on its merits rather than to 
treat it as something "hush-hush." Therefore, let's face up to the 
issues involved, however unpalatable they may be, and let's bring 
the problem out into the daylight where a more careful examina­
tion is possible. 
Why Some People Favor a "Preventive War" 
The premise of those who favor our making war against the 
Soviet Union in the near future is a very simple one, namely, that 
war between the United States and Russia is inevitable anyway, so 
why shouldn't we fight when the odds seem favorable to us? Pro­
ponents of a "preventive war" on our part maintain that the Com­
munists, and this includes the Soviet leaders, believe that a war to 
· the finish between communism and capitalism must come some­
time and that according to the philosophy of communism, the in-
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terests of a Communist state and those of a non-Communist power 
are irreconcilable. Therefore, since peaceful coexistence between 
Russia and the United States is impossible from the point of view 
of the Kremlin itself, it behooves us, says the "preventive war" 
school, to prepare now for the showdown and to attack when it suits 
us and not the Communists. 
Those who would have us launch the war first thus cite the 
Communist texts on the inevitability of war between the rival ide­
ologies and also the statements of Russian officials to the effect that 
capitalism is an enemy which must be vanquished by force. The 
violent anti-American tone of the Russian press and radio, the war­
like speeches of the high Soviet command and the constant stream 
of denunciations of the West pouring from behind the Iron Curtain 
all indicate, it is alleged, that the Soviet Union is convinced that the 
"cold war" must get really "hot" in the future. Analyzing Soviet 
psychology and reasoning, "preventive war" supporters declare that 
the basic strategy of communism never changes and that this 
strategy is based on the assumption that capitalist nations and the 
capitalist class must in time be liquidated by violence and war. That, 
it is maintained, is the ultimate goal of Russian Communist thinking. 
Furthermore, say such supporters, we should not be deceived 
by day-to-day changes or modifications in Communist tactics. When 
it seems advisable or convenient, the Russian government may talk 
peace or make concessions and Stalin may utter soothing words or 
agree to treaties which contain appealing phrases but all this, it is 
asserted, is just a matter of expediency and temporary a�justment 
which does not alter the hard core of Communist strategy built on 
the doctrine of an ultimate war to the finish. 
The Russians, therefore, will not hesitate to attack us, say 
the "preventive war" people, when they feel that they are ready. 
And when will they be ready? Here's where the atomic bomb comes 
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into the argument. Back in 1945, just after Hiroshima, the scient­
ists estimated that it would take the Russians from three to five 
years to produce an atomic bomb of their own. Nearly four years 
have passed since then and time is growing short, if the estimates 
are correct. Nowadays, some atomic experts say it may be 1952 or 
1953 before the Russians can produce the bomb with any degree 
of success, but what will happen when the American monopoly comes 
to an end? At that point, say those favoring a "preventive war," 
our present advantage stemming from our sole possession of the 
bomb will be gone and we shall be at the mercy of the ruthless dis­
ciples of Marx and his class-war school who will not hesitate to 
obliterate our cities when they deem themselves ready. 
Therefore, it is argued, why should we not attack fairly soon 
before the Russians get the bomb and prevent them from waging 
war on us at a later time? That's why there is talk of a "pre­
ventive war," a war to forestall a later Soviet onslaught which, it is 
declared, is bound to come at some point. This argument is but­
tressed by references to the Russian stand on the international con­
trol of atomic energy in the United Nations. If, it is asked, the Soviet 
Union genuinely desired peace, why didn't she subscribe to the plan 
for placing all fissionable material under the direction of an inter­
national agency, as proposed by the United States and all the non­
Communist members of the United Nations, thus removing atomic 
energy from the authority of any national government? Soviet op­
position to international control and Soviet insistence on freedom 
to manage atomic energy plants on her own, proves, it is claimed, 
that Russia wants to stock-pile bombs for her own purposes, which 
include a war against us when she thinks the time is ripe. 
Believers in a "preventive war" go on to describe what they 
think the situation will be like once the Russians acquire the bomb. 
They predict that it will be a time of almost unbearable tension. 
We shall be living in a war atmosphere, they say, with the threat of 
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terrible destruction hanging over us. Because there seems to be 
no adequate defense against an atomic bomb attack, the advantage 
lies with the attacker who will endeavor to destroy or paralyze his 
foe before the latter has a chance to retaliate or rally for a come­
back. Unlik� 1917 or 1941, . we shall not have time, it is said, to 
mobilize in a relatively leisurely fashion. To forestall the dreadful 
consequences of being attacked in an atomic war, each side will be 
under an almost overwhelming temptation to make a surprise at.; 
tack first, it is declared, and with the Russians in possession of the 
bomb, we shall be at the mercy of the Rusisan Communists unless 
we destroy them first. 
The logic of the "preventive war" school is thus clear: the 
Communists will make war on us sometime, believing as they do 
that such a war is inevitable, and are holding off until they acquire 
the atomic bomb and find the moment auspicious for their purposes; 
If that is the case, then why shouldn't we move up the time for the 
war while we alone have the bomb and in the name of our own self.,. 
defense strike while we have superiority instead of remaining pass­
ive while they prepare to hit us at their convenience? 
It is argued, however, that the United States, as a dem­
ocracy with a Constitution which requires a vote in Congress be­
fore we can legally make war, is not the kind of nation which can 
wage a "preventive war," that is, a war in which we suddenly at­
tack on our own initiative. To this the "preventive war'' people re­
ply that (1) the President and the military establishment should 
go ahead anyway and take quick military action without a delayed 
build-up in public opinion and in Congress, explaining the reasons 
later, and (2) the Russians are taking advantage of our good nature 
and our democratic ways. They know, it is claimed, that despite 
their belief in an inevitable armed clash, we are not the sort of 
country which will unleash an unprovoked attack. Our very virtues 
are our undoing, it is asserted; therefore, in dealing with a dictator-
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ship which can operate with speed and which can go to war without 
consulting the people of Russia, we should, it is urged, be prepared 
to move swiftly ourselves and thus surprise the Soviet rulers who 
are counting on our hatred of war and our reluctance to attack 
first as a means for allowing them to "blitz" us at a time of their 
choosing. 
What Opponents of a "Preventive War" Say 
The arguments against the "preventive war" philosophy fall 
into at least three main categories. One stresses the difficulties of a 
"preventive war" purely from the military point of view, a second 
challenges the assumption that war is inevitable and a third main­
tains that military force by itself cannot eradicate the menace of 
communism. Involved in the second and third arguments is really 
a fourth, namely, the point of view of morality which questions 
the right to bring on deliberately the horrors, death and destruction 
of war on the grounds of a hypothesis, the hypothesis or assumption 
that war is inevitable when that hypothesis cannot really be proved. 
Taking up the military problem first, critics of the ''pre­
ventive war" idea assert that its advocates seem to assume that 
defeating Soviet Russia would involve merely tossing some atomic 
bombs on Russian cities and that after that,the Soviet Union would 
cry quits and sue for peace. The attitude that victory over Russia 
could be gained in this fairly easy and relatively effortless fashion 
is seriously questioned, however, by many experts, both military and 
civilian, who have studied the problem. In the first place, these ex­
perts say that Russia is so vast and the dispersion of industry and 
resources is on such an enormous scale that atomic bombing of cer­
tain cities would be insufficient for a knockout blow. Furthermore, 
it is claimed, at the first sign of attack the Russian army would 
sweep over Western Europe and ensconce itself in virtually every 
corner of that continent. Would we then drop atomic bombs on Paris, 
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Brussels, Rome and other cities inhabited by peoples friendly to us 
in order to disrupt Russian military establishments? That would 
be a tough question to decide. 
Above all, say the experts, the war could not be won by 
bombs alone. In the last analysis, it is troops which would have 
to support air attack and carry the day by actually defeating the 
armed forces of the enemy. Therefore, so goes the argument, 
we should have to be prepared to transport armies overseas, land 
them in Europe, and smash the Soviet military machine in direct 
combat. In other words, if the Soviets occupied Europe, we would 
have to have another "D-Day" all over again and would have to 
challenge a powerful foe well entrenched behind the Atlantic sea 
wall. Even if resistance in the West prevented the Russians from 
smashing immediately to the ocean, huge American reinforcements 
would have to be ready for fighting in Europe. The experiences of 
both Napoleon and Hitler in trying to conquer Russia are cited as 
evidence of the extreme difficulty which might be encountered if 
an attempt were made to invade Russia itself, a land which 
stretches thousands of miles from Poland across Siberia to the 
Pacific. 
Then, say the "preventive war" opponents, suppose Russia 
is vanquished, suppose that even air attacks brought about Soviet 
peace overtures, we would still have to send a huge army of occupa­
tion to insure Russian compliance with our peace terms. Equipping 
and maintaining the large armies needed both for war and for or­
cupation would, it is claimed, strain the American economy to the 
utmost. Our way of life would be transformed; we would have to 
become, state some experts, a military nation, with our manpower 
and industry geared to the needs of a titanic military establishment. 
Our relaxed, democratic ways, our production of civilian goods, our 
peacetime pursuits would all disappear under the harsh necessity 
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of supporting naval, ground and air forces capable of subduing a 
powerful enemy and of holding him down afterward. 
A "preventive war," therefore, is not something to be en­
tered upon lightly. Those who have misgivings about such an en­
terprise emphasize the tremendous problems involved and stress 
what such a war would do to our democracy. They declare that a war 
against Russia could not possibly be worth the carnage, devasta­
tion and ruinous economic burdens entailed and suggest that it 
would be such a disaster in so many ways that it should be thought 
of only as a last resort when absolutely no other alternative giving 
us a chance for survival seemed at hand. 
Is War Inevitable? 
Next, fault is found with the assumption that war with the 
Soviet Union is inevitable. Those not in sympathy with the 
"preventive war" point of view sometimes concede that war is pos­
sible and that Communist ideology stresses the inevitability of a 
showdown fight between communism and rival ideologies. They 
may admit also that Russian behavior since 1945 has appeared to 
be belligerent and non-cooperative. However, the opposition be­
lieves that there is a chance, and not a slender one at that, that the 
Soviet system can be halted without a war. It is pointed out that 
the Kremlin leaders have pushed ahead whenever the going looked 
easy, as in Eastern Europe, but that they have hesitated and acted 
cautiously when confronted by formidable power. This line of 
reasoning maintains that the Communist bosses are realists and, 
unlike Hitler, are rational; that is, they will not go adventuring if 
the odds look so great against them that they might lose. There­
fore, it is contended that if the United States and like-minded na­
tions build up a power coalition which out-balances the U. S. S. R., 
the Russians will be deterred from attacking, should they be so 
minded, and will refrain from pressing matters to the breaking 
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point. Furthermore, there are some who believe that the U. S. S. R. 
has no aggressive designs whatsoever and that Russian moves 
since 1945 have been primarily defensive anyway. 
The concept of a power alignment offsetting Russian power 
as a means of inducing the Soviets to refrain from warlike actions, 
if they have any such intentions, underlies the whole American 
policy of "containment" as expressed in the Truman doctrine, aid to 
Greece and Turkey and the Atlantic Pact. The hope is that the prns­
pect of being confronted by superior force will remove any tempta­
tion on the part of the Communists to engage in an all-out war. Re-· 
inforcing this view is the claim that the Communists themselves 
are in no hurry, believing as they do that time is on their side and 
that no exact timetable of conquest on Hitler's model is necessary, 
and that if we can hold firm indefinitely, they can be contained in­
definitely. Thus, in time, they will come to accept the fact, it is said, 
that they must adjust to a situation in which a larger measure of 
cooperation is the only alternative to a hopeless war. Isn't it 
better, ask the "preventive war" critics, to proceed on these lines 
and to take the chance of averting war in this fashion, than to pro­
voke hostilities deliberately and bathe the world in blood on the 
basis of an uproved assumption that such a holocaust must come 
anyway? 
What happens when the Russians get the bomb? Here 
again the opponents of a "preventive war" admit that there will be 
severe tension and considerable danger. But, it is said, we have 
such a head start and will have so many more bombs available than 
they at any given point, that they will not be assured of any easy 
success should they decide to unleash a surprise attack. Provided 
we disperse our atomic resources so that we could survive an initial 
blow with considerable stores of bombs left for a counterattack, 
the Russians would have to reckon with a retaliatory onslaught, the 
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thought of which, it is asserted, ought to operate as a fairly ef­
fective deterrent. Thus, if we build up power on our side, and pre­
pare sensibly for a possible surprise blow against us, we should, it 
is argued, be able to convince the Russians that war would be too 
dangerous for them. In time, then, they would have to settle down 
and recognize that the goal of world communism was impossible of 
achievement without risks which would appear overwhelming. 
Above all, say those opposed to a "preventive war," by avoiding 
hysteria and provocative measur�s which could goad Russia into 
belligerent countermoves and by keeping the diplomatic situation 
fluid, with room for negotiation, we can, with careful leadership, 
a1-rive at a stable relationship. 
A "Preventive War" and Communism 
A third major argument against a "preventive war" is that 
even if it were successful in destroying Russian military power, it 
would not eliminate communism. In fact, some declare, such an at­
tack by us would stimulate its growth. The contention is that com­
munism is an idea which appeals to people who are in distress and 
who are dissatisfied with existing conditions, and which thrives on 
disorder and chaos. Therefore, the claim is, unless we help to im­
prove the lot of millions throughout the globe who see in communism 
a chance to alter a state of affairs which they consider unsatisfac­
tory, we shall not win them as converts to our cause. 
Difficult as it is for us to realize, communism as an idea, it 
is pointed out, has an appeal for the impoverished and the dis­
possesssed who long to improve their status. The reality of com­
munism in Russia and in the satellite states is one thing but to 
people in Asia, Africa and the Near East who hear only the Com­
munist promises of education, of more material goods, of medical 
care and of "freedom" for the masses, the dream of communism 
has a drawing power which, it is maintained, can be counteracted 
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best by our showing that our way offers at least as much and a lot 
more. Those who do not countenance the thought of a "preventiv� 
war" insist, therefore, that a military conquest of Russia would not 
eradicate the roots of communism which flourish in discontent and 
misery. We would still, after victory, have to take care of the popula­
tions who have proved susceptible to communist propaganda. And a 
war, it is stated, would increase the unrest and reduce the standards 
of living making more friends for communism than ever. 
We and the Communists are struggling to capture men's 
minds. Military means alone, say the foes of a "preventive war," do 
not win out in this psychological struggle: you can't spread dem­
ocracy by bayonets and machine guns. If we attacked Russia first, 
wouldn't we, it is asked, play right into the hands of the Com­
munists who would say, "See, we told you those capitalists were 
warmongers who don't care about human welfare and who don't 
shrink at wholesale slaughter"? How would we look to the rest 
of the world? 
Alternatives to War 
Ideas and ideals have tremendous power in themselves, and 
military force by itself is sterile, as Hitler's efforts to win con­
quered populations by repression alone has shown. Hence, say 
those condemning a "preventive war," it is up to us to prove that 
democracy is better and has more to offer materially and morally 
than communism, and we can't do that solely by a display of armed 
might. Creating a defensive military alignment to hem in Soviet 
expansionism may be a necessary step but, it is alleged, this is 
largely a negative measure which mu�t be coupled with a positive 
policy of outbidding the Communists in terms of benefits and ideo­
logical appeal. Communist ideology will be beaten, therefore, not 
by force but by a better ideological and material offensive on our 
part, it is claimed. 
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At this point, "preventive war" opponents call attention to 
the fact that we Americans are really revolutionaries in the modern 
world. Peoples everywhere have been stirred by our accomplish­
ments. They want what we have to offer and can produce. Amer­
ican movies and the gadgets such as cigarette lighters, wrist 
watches, fountain pens and knives carried by our GI's to all corners 
of the earth have, for example, created a demand for such items by 
populations everywhere. These peoples are not content with their 
present material standards and are demanding and pressing for a 
share of the wonders which the United States has on display. The 
United States has created a global ferment and the Communists in 
many instances have capitalized on this unrest by promising to fill 
such wants . But Soviet production is now unequal to the task. An 
imaginative America, it is declared, can take the initiative from 
communism by sharing our "know how" and turning our technical 
skill in the direction of assisting others to participate more fully in 
the benefits to be derived from our type of enterprise under demo­
cratic auspices. 
Instead of waging war to beat communism, it is argued that 
we can come out on top, through skillful diplomacy and by adding a 
program of economic and social welfare to our defensive military 
arrangements. In this fashion, say the exponents of this position, 
we may avoid the horrors of war, and assume an unassailable type 
· of leadership in world affairs which will win us firm friends and
pull the props out from Communist arguments. To· attack Russia
first would mean, according to this thesis, that we would sacrifice
our moral hold on men's minds and would enable the Communists
to call us selfish imperialists bent on global supremacy for the sake
of profits and power. In line with this argument, Mr. David E.
Lilienthal, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, said re­
cently, "There are those among us who have been bewitched by
the atomic bomb ........ But it is important for us to recognize that 
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neither the atomic bomb nor any form of power ........ constitutes the 
true source of American strength ........ That source is our ethical and 
moral standards of precepts and our democratic faith in man. This 
faith is the chief armament of our democracy. It is the most 
potent weapon ever devised." 
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